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Introduction and outline 
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of the gas industry is its rapid growth during 
recent years. Production of gas world-wide rose by almost 5% between 1998 and 1999, 
with Russia, Algeria, Norway and Argentina experiencing the most rapid change (IGU, 
2000a and 200b). Output of the North Sea producers (Great Britain, Norway and the 
Netherlands) has expanded by over 77% during the last decade, supplying large 
importers such as Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Spain. International trade has 
grown as consumption in the leading importers - America, Japan and Germany, and the 
Asian-Pacific area - has increased rapidly in recent years. These developments point to 
the success of gas in displacing other fuels in the energy mix, and represent not merely 
an economic response to relative price changes but in addition a fundamental switch in 
taste towards less polluting fuels. Particularly significant have been the growth in 
markets in power generation, co-generation, transport (sales to natural gas vehicles), 
cooling and dehumidification (especially in Asian markets). 
On the policy front, the impact of regulatory reform has been important 
particularly throughout North America and Europe
1.  The deregulation of the electricity 
sector and its opening to market trading has tended to work in favour of gas as older 
                                                 
1 Colin Robinson detected the beginnings of  a  Schumpeterian 'gale of creative destruction' in the UK 
in1994 (Robinson, 1994)   2
less flexible power stations are phased out, and nuclear expansion slowed and in some 
cases reversed. Countries most recently affected here are Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and, outside of Europe, in Korea.  
The aim of this paper is to assess the efficiency and performance of a wide 
range of gas industries using recently published country level data on essential outputs 
and inputs. Detailed individual country studies of efficiency have been carried out 
before by Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) and by Kim and Lee (1995). Neither of these 
attempted to compare the national industry with international experience. More recently 
Yunos and Hawdon (1997) and Kim et al. (1999) have attempted international 
comparisons for electricity and gas respectively. Yunos and Hawdon focused 
particularly on developing countries while Kim et al. examined the performance of gas 
companies in North America, Europe, Japan and Korea. The analysis in this paper gives 
a wider coverage based on over 30 countries in order to attempt a balanced assessment 
of factors affecting efficiency. 
 
 
Gas policy developments 
Significant policy developments affecting the gas industry since the mid 1980s  have 
included the privatization, liberalization and deregulation of national gas markets, and 
the reduction of trade barriers within important multinational groupings. The process 
commenced in the United States, was followed in the United Kingdom and currently 
dominates the debate over gas policy in the European Union (EU) as well as in other 
countries.  
In the United States, reform was precipitated by the impact of falling oil prices   3
during the 1980s on a market which had become locked into high price long term 
contracts for gas. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decision to 
release distributors from take-or-pay provisions in 1984 led to the stranding of many 
gas pipeline contracts. In 1992, pipeline companies were required to unbundle 
transportation, storage and open access. The resulting upsurge in competition, and 
development of spot markets led to significant falls in the price of gas. This makes the 
US experience a powerful model in favour of more competitive markets elsewhere. 
The UK gas market has also liberalized significantly. Between privatization in 
1986 and the passing of the 1995 Gas Act, the industry regulator,  the Office for Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) (and before that the Office of Gas Regulation, Ofgas)
2, 
has sought to introduce competition into the gas market. The 1995 Act opened up the 
UK retail market to competition in a process which was completed by May 1998. This 
was followed by the commencement of gas storage auctioning in 1999, the development 
of new gas capacity, balancing and trading arrangements involving an On-The-Day-
Commodity Market (OCM )  and most recently by the auctioning of entry and exit 
capacity. Regulation of prices is still significant however, as indicated in discussions 
over Transco’s price control for the period 2002 to 2007.  
Although energy, including gas, was not part of the original policy ambit of the 
European Union, significant intervention began in the early 1990s with the price 
transparency Directive of June 1990, followed in May 1991 by the Directive covering 
the transit of natural gas via grids.  More important was the adoption on 22 June 1998 of 
the Directive on the interior gas market (European Commission, 1998).  Although the 
directive took effect on 10th August 2000 various member countries had already begun   4
to open their markets.  Some countries (UK, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy and Spain) 
have already implemented the directive at least in part (European Commission, 2000).  
Others like Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Netherland 
are moving towards implementation while Greece and Portugal have still to begin the 
process.  The effectiveness of the Directive is likely to be variable because of lack of 
agreement on access charging and unbundling.  Most producers are reluctant to separate 
transportation, storage and trading activities as the UK has done.  Lack of agreement on 
access to upstream pipeline networks could  significantly slow access to cheapest 
sources of gas.  Although the Commission anticipates that 77.9% of the 15 member 
market will be open by 2000, 90 % by 2008 and 91.4% ‘later’, a large variation in 
implementation (from 33% to 100%) is anticipated. 
The development of trade in gas within Europe  was already apparent from the 
opening of the interconnector between UK and Belgium in October 1998.  The 1998 
Gas Directive provides further stimulus to this process.  Pipeline owners are required to 
give access to third parties to the extent that capacity is available. Although owners can 
refuse to provide access on a number of grounds including public-service obligations, or 
serious economic and financial difficulties with take or pay contracts, it is likely that the 
Directive will promote significant extra competitive pressures on operators. 
 
 
Distinguishing features of the gas industry 
In seeking to understand developments in the gas industry, it is important to recognise 
some special feature of the gas industry (Newbery, 2000). These include 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Ofgem is an amalgamation of Ofgas and Offer.    5
♦  Opaque and ill defined costs. 
♦  Production determined by geology which influences exploration, production and 
pipeline investment and operating costs. 
♦  Producers’ preferences for guaranteed markets/long term contracts/ high prices to 
recover investment costs together with a tendency to desire vertical integration.  
♦  Consumer preference for long term security of supply.  
All of the above factors constitute barriers against efficiency improvements in 
the gas industry. That European countries have been able to overcome some of these 
barriers is due to a unique set of circumstances including the expansion of offshore  
supplies in Europe,  the availability of gas from Russia following the collapse of its 
domestic economy post cold war, the extension of international pipeline systems, 
investment in Liquid National Gas (LNG) terminals to ensure diversity of supply 
sources, removal of discriminatory access to third party pipeline networks,  and the 
opening of the electricity market to gas. One of the purposes of this paper is to establish 
whether these conditions have led to improved levels of efficiency. 
 
 
Measuring the efficiency of the gas industry 
The efficiency literature distinguishes between technical and allocative efficiency (Fare 
et al., 1994). Technical efficiency concerns the relationship between inputs and outputs 
such that a firm is efficient if it achieves maximum output for given inputs or minimum 
input utilization for given outputs. Allocative efficiency assumes technical efficiency, 
and compares alternative positions in terms of relative prices, either of inputs or   6
outputs.  In attempting to measure the efficiency of the gas industries of various 
countries gas consumption or sales are used as a measure of output.  This ensures the 
focus is on the downstream element of the gas industry which handles imported as well 
as domestically produced gas.  Gas production (the upstream part of the industry) has a 
very different structure to the publicly owned or regulated downstream industry and it is 
that latter part which is of interest.  Gas production is carried out by a mixture of oil and 
gas companies often large multinational oil producers.  The analysis is confined to gas 
from its entry into the bulk transmission system, through the local distribution networks 
to the final consumer.  
An important feature of this part of the gas industry is that it is multiproduct in 
that gas is supplied under different conditions to different types of consumers. 
Household, industrial, commercial and power station customers have very different load 
and other characteristics, and can be supplied on either continuous or interruptible 
bases. At the same time, availability of gas is important to consumers. Finally, 
regulatory authorities prefer that industries supply as many potential customers as 
possible. Thus at a minimum, sales and numbers of customers should be taken as 
separate outputs when considering the efficiency and performance of the gas industry. 
Two major inputs into gas transmission and distribution are the labour force 
involved in gas industry activities and the capital services of the  pipeline system which 
connects producers to consumers.  The labour force requires specialist skills in gas 
supply and engineering, as well as non specific skills in sales and administration. The 
services of a pipeline system depend on a wide variety of factors including  pipeline 
diameter and  length, inlet and outlet pressures and the availablity of compressor 
equipment to regulate operating pressures. Other factors affecting supply include the   7
availability of storage capacity for seasonal and other top-up to regular supplies. The 
gas network  functions in a fairly complex way to deliver gas to users.  
The environment in which the gas industry functions varies considerably from 
country to country, in terms of the terrain over which gas is transported, the geographic 
density of customers, and their economic characteristics. While this is easily recognised, 
treatment of such individual circumstances can be affected by strategic considerations. 
Producers have an interest in stressing the uniqueness of the conditions of supply since 
regulatory concessions often flow from such recognition. Any such concessions may 
however be welfare reducing as they remove pressure on producers to improve 
efficiency in the absence of properly functioning competitive markets. It is sensible to 
adopt a cautious approach to the inclusion of environmental variables and incorporate 
them only when the evidence is clear. 
The same cautious approach should be displayed towards potential economies 
of scale arguments. One of the major arguments used in favour of public ownershipis 
that a single producer would enjoy the benefits of large scale production. This argument 
is taken to justify the absence of competition for the incumbent firm. In practice, as 
electricity industry experience has shown,  the opportunities for profitable operation at 
small scale are often considerable once appropriate incentives are in place. 
 
 
Data and Methodology 
In order to test whether changes in regulatory regime, levels of cost reducing investment 
and other factors have impacted on the performance of the gas industry, a frontier 
estimation technique is used to estimate a model with the following outputs and inputs   8
Outputs:   Gas consumption, numbers of customers 
Inputs:   Employment, pipelines 
Previous work on efficiency estimation has used either stochastic frontier 
methods (SFA) or data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques. SFA has a number of 
well known advantages - parameters of economically meaningful production functions 
can be estimated, scale effects can be identified, and, at least in the panel variants of this 
approach, individual efficiencies can be identified (Kalirajan and Shand, 1999). 
On the other hand satisfactory estimates can only be obtained from relatively 
large data sets because the numbers of parameters are often large. At a deeper level, 
assumptions have to be made both about the functional form, which can be tested, and 
about the distribution of two types of error - the divergence of observations from the 
efficient frontier and the usual stochastic error term found in econometric investigation - 
which can not.  Again the stochastic models are not able to cope satisfactorily with 
multiproduct firms. 
DEA on the other hand can cope relatively easilt with multiple outputs and 
inputs. In addition DEA requires minimal assumptions regarding the structure of 
production, and places no restriction on the functional form relating inputs to outputs. It 
produces detailed information on the efficiency of the unit not only relative to the 
efficient frontier but also to specific efficient units which can be identified as role 
models or comparators. It identifies slack in specific inputs so that sources of 
inefficiency can be analysed.  A major shortcoming of DEA has until recently been its 
failure to deal effectively with the stochastic element of efficiency estimation. This is 
because DEA is based on an optimisation procedure which uses linear programming 
techniques to locate those producers who combine given inputs most efficiently to   9
produce relevant output. These methods are sensitive to inaccuracies in input values and 
may yield alternative optimal solutions even when data is accurate. In the latter case, 
the efficiency estimates are not affected only the identification of comparators. The 
sensitivity to data is a more fundamental problem and places a considerable onus on 
care in data selection so that  meaningful results can be obtained. The bulk of  previous 
DEA studies have  lacked estimates of the uncertainties surrounding individual 
efficiencies or the impacts of specific variables. 
Recently, however, considerable advances have been made in the incorporation 
of uncertainty  in DEA.  Banker(1993) showed both that DEA is a maximum likelihood 
estimator of efficiency and that the estimates are consistent (i.e. the bias decreases as 
the sample size increases). He also suggested various tests for differences of efficiency 
estimates between models, including the Kolmogrov-Smirnov and t-test for nested 
models.  These tests have been explored in some depth using Monte Carlo methods by 
Kittelsen (1999a) who has investigated the sensitivity of DEA estimates to the 
following problems 
1.   The property that the greater the number of restrictions placed on the model, the 
higher the measured efficiency values will be. 
2.  The known bias in DEA efficiency estimates. This bias arises because DEA  
indicates that certain units are 100% efficient (the comparator set) and yet the 
probability of a unit being exactly 100% efficient is  zero.  The extent of the 
bias, which is upward,  will vary with the sample size but could be quite 
important for small samples. 
3.  The fact that the efficiency values are dependent because they are calculated in 
relation to the most efficient units in the data set. This makes it difficult to   10
satisfy the assumption of independently distributed units which lie behind many 
statistical tests. 
Kittelsen (1999b) finds that dependency and bias work in opposite directions 
with a tendency to cancel each other out.  Thus it is possible to use the tests 
recommended by Banker.  The t-test can be used when “bias is low due to large 
samples, low dimensionality (numbers of outputs and inputs), and inefficiency 
distributions that are dense at the frontier. If bias is somewhat higher, the .. Kolmogrov- 
Smirnov test is better” (p. 49). 
The Kittelsen approach is a general to specific method of testing nested models 
(see Kittelsen, 1999a).  Taking any two sets of efficiency estimates, for example one 
with and one without a specific input variable, the Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) tests the 
computed maximum absolute difference between the cumulated distribution function of 
the two sets of estimates, This is defined as D = supE{S0(E)-S1(E)} where S0 and S1 are 
the relevant cumulated distributions of measured efficiencies. The t-test is the familiar t 
test for the equality of group means and is distributed with (n0 + n1 - 2) degrees of 
freedom where n0 and n1 are the sizes of the samples. The KS  test allows for the entire 
distribution of efficiencies while the t-test is a test of average impacts. It can be applied 
because the distribution of the sample means will be approximately normal in large 
samples by the central limit theorem. 
That the various DEA models are nested is clearly seen from the specification 
of the VRS model as the general model: 
F(yσVRS)={x: y ≤ zM, zN ≤ x, Σ zj = 1},   z γν
J , y γν
M     (1)  
The CRS model is obtained by removing the last constraint,  Σ zj = 1. 
F(yσCRS)={x: y ≤ zM, zN ≤ x},   z γν
J, y γν
M       (2)    11




Although data on gas production and prices is relatively abundant, very little material is 
available on productive inputs and costs for the purpose of international comparisons.  
This study uses data made available from the International Gas Union on 61 countries 
including developed and developing countries. Unfortunately, no split is available for 
the different functions carried out within the industry such as transmission,  distribution 
or storage. Thus the results on efficiencies provide only a broad brush comparison and 
they will need to be supplemented by further investigated at a more disaggregated level 
(see Kim et al. 1999) for an example of a firm by firm comparison focusing on Japan). 
Countries were included if data was available on  two outputs - consumption 
and customer numbers; two inputs - employees and length of pipelines; and four 
environmental variables - share of gas in total energy (SH), growth in demand (RF), 
reform in terms of privatization or deregulation (Reform), and responsiveness to the 
European Union Gas Directive (Dir). Of the original 61 countries, some were excluded 
as clear outliers. These included both the USA and Russia, whose gas industries were 
many times the size of any other developed country. Venezuela was excluded because 
of concerns about the data. Ultimately, 33 countries were considered suitable for 
inclusion.  
The most general model involved all 8 variables and an assumption of variable 
returns to scale. DEA efficiency estimates were made for this most general model. Then 
assumptions are changed and variables removed from the model either singly or in   12
groups and the significance of these changes tested using the KS and t-tests described 
above.  The null hypothesis of zero difference in efficiency measurements between the 
nesting and the nested model is used to justify exclusion (null hypothesis accepted) or 
inclusion (null hypothesis rejected) in the model. For example, the full VRS model 
yielded average measured DEA efficiencies of 0.869. Nested within this model is the 
less restrictive constant returns to scale (CRS) model found by dropping the VRS 
assumption. In the CRS model with identical variables, the average efficiency is found 
to be 0.798 but the difference in efficiencies is not sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis on both KS and t tests (see Table 1). In this instance, CRS is accepted as the 
basic model. 
{Table 1 about here} 
The model is then tested to see whether it is multi product by removing 
variable YCUST   from the data set. This is rejected by both the KS and the t-tests but only 
at the 5% level.  Since the two tests are conservative in tending to over-reject, YCUST is 
not rtemoved.  Retention of YCUST supports the use of the multiproduct model.  
Exclusion of the EU Directive is accepted by both tests as is the exclusion of 
the combination of Reform and the Directive. However, when RF is added to the group, 
both the KS and t tests are significant at the 1% level suggesting that one out of the 
group is significant. The next test suggests that Reform is not the significant variable 
when made conditional on the Directive. On the other hand, RF conditional on Reform 
and the Directive is significant at the 5% level so that RF should be retained in the 
analysis. The SH variable, measuring the importance of gas in the energy mix, is not 
seen as significant and may safely be left out of the model. Finally a test of exclusion of   13
Pipelines as an input is rejected at the 5% level by the KS test but is accepted by the t-
test. Since the KS test is superior for small samples, it is concluded that Pipelines 
should be included in the model. 
Although the data set is small and relates to only one year, a few conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly a multi product two input production process model is not rejected 
by the data. Secondly, there is some evidence that efficiencies are significantly affected 
by rising/falling gas sales. It is not unreasonable to suppose that investment in an 
expanding market includes cost saving improvements which would be difficult to justify 
during periods when contraction occurs. On the other hand, neither of the policy-related 
variables seem to have had any significant effects. The EU Directive does not appear 
yet to have stimulated any marked productivity improvements in affected countries even 
though freeing of trade is one of its objectives. More importantly, the various market 
reforms taken as a group do not seem to have had any measurable effect either. This is 
probably because of the diversity of types of reform which a more sensitive set of 
measurements might have distinguished. Interestingly, however, high efficiency scores 
were obtained by some reforming countries e.g. Great Britain (GB), and these were 
maintained consistently across all models.  
One problem with the DEA analysis so far is that it has ignored dynamic 
considerations.  Sengupta (1995) has pointed out that the actual input output 
combination observed at any one time may not be optimal because adjustment processes 
are taking place.  Thus units which appear optimal on DEA measurement may in fact 
prove to be inferior in the long run once factors are fully adjusted. Sengupta gives two 
reasons for this: “first ... capital inputs have a multiperiod dimension, since they 
generate outputs in future periods … current input (DEA) thus biasing efficiency   14
comparisons against capital-intensive processes. Secondly, DMUs may take more  than 
one time period to adjust their decision variables” (Sengupta, 1994, p. 119).  Further, 
“the DMU may be efficient for some of the time and inefficient for other times” (p. 
120).  Sengupta developed his ideas in the framework of a log linear production 
function which is not employed here.  Instead the dynamic effects are tested by 
including a quadratic term in the change in XPIPES between 1997 and 1998 (∆XPIPES) in 
the production frontier. 
The results are somewhat inconclusive (see Table 2).  Clearly, adding a 
variable to the minimal DEA model improves the average efficiency result (from 0.669 
to 0.796) as would be expected.  Neither the KS nor the t-test are passed at the 1% level 
of significance, although both are significant at the 5% level.  This suggests that 
dynamic effects whilst they cannot be ignored may  be difficult to isolate.  It is 
noteworthy that including the lagged value of pipelines (XPIPES97) in the model did not 
make any difference to measured efficiencies.  Lack of data prevented further analysis 
of dynamic effects at this stage of the research. 
{Table 2 about here} 
In general, measured efficiencies are as expected  In the countries of the EU, 
they  range from 1 (GB, Ireland and Netherlands) to 0.444  but are higher on average 
than for the set as a whole. The most efficient region was the Japan/Asia/Australia 
group with  Australia, Japan, Korea,  Malaysia and Thailand all achieving unit scores. 
By contrast the lowest efficiencies were recorded in other European countries, although  
Hungary, Ukraine and Poland were above average. Both Canada and Iran had above 
average efficiencies. (Table 3 gives the efficiency scores for all 33 counties in the   15
sample.) 
{Table 3 about here} 
Marginal products (per 100 extra units of the factor) are given in the second 
and fifth columns of Table 4. They show higher than average marginal products 
(MPCONS) per employee in the EU, Africa, Iran and Canada.  GB's marginal product by 
contrast is quite low, suggesting that the industry has exhausted any potential size 
advantages. On the other hand GB seems particularly productive in terms of customers 
per employee generating 33% higher than world levels. This lends some support to the 
view that one of the effects of privatization has been to reduce quality (customer 
service) as firms have focused on cost reduction. However, Austria, Spain, Sweden, 
France and Germany have even higher marginal product per customer (MPCUST )and in 
their cases the reason must lie elsewhere than in reform. Pipeline productivity shows a 
different pattern: highest marginal productivities are found for Other European 
countries (Bosnia, Hungary, Poland and Latvia having particularly high MPCUST) 
suggesting potential for expansion in terms of new customers in these countries. In 
terms of sales, pipelines are most productive in North African and Iran, indicating less 
mature markets than in Europe and Japan/Asia/Australia (JAA). 
{Table 4 about here} 
The existence of slack in factor utilisation indicates potential for relatively 
painless efficiency improvements. Labour slack is particularly high in  Africa and in 
Other European countries, areas characterised by significant state control of enterprises. 
By contrast labour slack is non existent throughout the EU, Canada and JAA.  Slack in 
pipeline utilisation has a  rather different implication. Spare pipeline capacity provides   16
extra security in the system and can substitute for scarce storage resources. It can be 
helpful in the development of markets. Within the EU, France and Germany have slack 
pipeline capacity suggesting one of the conditions for  market liberalization is met there. 
On the other hand, some results are difficult to interpret. Canada for example has the 




Often empirical work in economics is hindered by lack of appropriate statistical 
information. This is particularly so in the gas industry where vital information relative 
to the restructuring of the industry is often unavailable because of the tradition of 
bilateral negotiations between government agencies and large state run companies that 
has dominated this sector in the past. Even in the era of privatization, the persistence of 
monopoly has, until recently, hindered the release of information on which yardstick 
evaluation of comparable activities can be made. This is one aspect of the “legacy of 
monopoly” as Colin Robinson has called it (Robinson, 1994, p14). This paper has made 
use of recently available data which provides a snapshot from which relative efficiency 
estimates can be made. Some results are surprising - the lack of clearly defined 
economies of scale, for instance. Some are less so - the inability to detect significant 
dynamic processes in gas production/distribution. Nevertheless the analysis does lend 
support to the notion that the reforms introduced in GB and intended in the rest of the 
EU are associated with high levels of technical efficiency, good utilization of labour and 
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Table 1: Tests For Gas Efficiency Model 
 Ho: Exclude..  Change in Mean  KS  test  t-test  Conclusion 
VRS  0.0710 0.1818  1.3553  Accept  CRS 
 YCUST  0.1580 0.2424*  2.2507*  Reject  exclusion 
 XDIR  0.0200 0.0909  0.3475  Accept  exclusion 
XREFORM+DIR  0.0700 0.2121  1.1220  Accept  exclusion 
XRF+REF+DIR  0.2180 0.3636** 3.3115** Reject  exclusion 
XREF!DIR  0.0500 0.2102  0.7942  Accept  exclusion 
XRF!REF  0.1480 0.2727*  2.0880*  Reject  exclusion 
XSH!RF+REF+DIR  0.0340 0.1337  0.7488  Accept  exclusion 
XPIPES!EMP++  0.1020 0.2424*  1.5212  Reject  exclusion 
Critical   5%* 
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Table 2: Tests For Dynamic Effects 
Ho: Exclude..  Change in Mean  KS  test  t-test  Conclusion 
∆Pipes  0.1270 0.2549*  1.9747*  Inconclusive 
XPIPES97  0.0000 0 0  Accept  exclusion 
Critical   5%* 
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Table 3: Measured Efficiencies Using Input Oriented DEA Model 
COUNTRY CODE  EFFICIENCY
ALGERIA Al  0.410 
AUSTRALIA AU  1.000 
AUSTRIA A  0.497 
BELGIUM B  0.764 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BAH  0.567 
BULGARIA BU  0.287 
CANADA C    0.775 
CZECH REPUBLIC  CAR  0.408 
DENMARK D  0.543 
ESTONIA E  0.427 
FINLAND IF  0.782 
FRANCE F  0.627 
GERMANY G  0.569 
GREAT BRITAIN  GB  1.000 
HUNGARY H  0.966 
IRAN IRA  0.721 
IRELAND I  1.000 
ITALY IT  0.622 
JAPAN J  1.000 
KOREA K  1.000 
LATVIA L  0.585 
LITHUANIA LI  0.148 
MALAYSIA M  1.000 
NETHERLANDS N  1.000 
NEW ZEALAND  NZ  0.458 
POLAND P  0.686 
ROMANIA R  0.310 
SPAIN S  0.903 
SWEDEN SW  0.444 
THAILAND T  1.000 
TUNISIA TU.  0.390 
UKRAINE U  0.824 
YUGOSLAVIA Y  0.352 
Source: IGU & Author’s calculations   22
 
Table 4: Factor Productivity And Slacks 
COUNTRY EMPLOYEES  PIPELINES 
  MPCONS  MPCUST  SLACK MPCONS  MPCUST  SLACK 
ALGERIA 0.0 0.0 11120.7 18.7 46339.0 0.0
AUSTRALIA 14.2 63210.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AUSTRIA 17.1 71138.1 0.0 1.2 4948.1 0.0
BELGIUM 14.1 59514.6 0.0 1.0 4178.6 0.0
BOSNIA-H’VINA 0.0 0.0 63.3 7.2 56699.5 0.0
BULGARIA 14.8 38.1 0.0 1.8 4.6 0.0
CANADA 18.7 31008.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38826.5
CZECH REP  8.6 58937.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2660.8
DENMARK 8.5 15334.9 0.0 19.5 35083.3 0.0
ESTONIA 11.3 65753.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 105.7
FINLAND 41.7 9449.5 0.0 2.0 463.9 0.0
FRANCE 7.9 63664.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 4925.1
GERMANY 10.0 52599.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 7262.3
GREAT BRITAIN  6.9 41058.1 0.0 3.4 20508.5 0.0
HUNGARY 0.0 0.0 7782.0 8.9 55230.7 0.0
IRAN 11.4 28934.6 0.0 7.6 19262.9 0.0
IRELAND 12.4 29869.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ITALY 6.2 38649.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
JAPAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 20929.3 0.0
KOREA 4.0 43489.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LATVIA 0.0 0.0 1031.4 6.1 56183.5 0.0
LITHUANIA 10.5 71604.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MALAYSIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 72.3 0.0
NETHERLANDS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NEW ZEALAND  35.9 38532.0 0.0 2.8 2978.1 0.0
POLAND 0.0 0.0 13111.7 3.8 57962.1 0.0
ROMANIA 0.0 0.0 3508.7 26.5 26884.6 0.0
SPAIN 12.3 78667.9 0.0 0.7 4288.1 0.0
SWEDEN 31.6 46933.6 0.0 2.3 3440.9 0.0
THAILAND 5.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TUNISIA 48.9 46238.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 944.3
UKRAINE 0.0 0.0 15687.6 8.3 49340.9 0.0
YUGOSLAVIA 12.7 21716.6 0.0 2.3 3920.2 0.0
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